Abstract: To improve the efficiency of group signature, an efficient and secure dynamic group signature scheme is proposed based on the ELGamal encryption and signature of knowledge. It allows the group manager to add new members or delete old members freely. Furthermore, the length of the signature and the computational effort for signing and verifying are independent of the number of the group members and the deleted group members. So it may have many practical applications in e-commerce and military.
but they do not reveal the identity of the signer. Furthermore, it is not possible to decide whether two signatures have been issued by the same group member, However, there exists a designated group manager who can, in case of a later dispute, open signatures and reveal the identity of the signer.
The salient features of group signatures make them attractive for many specialized applications such as voting and bidding. More generally, group signatures can be used to conceal organizational structures.
After introduction of the concept of group signature, many group signature schemes [2−4] have been proposed.
But all of them can not revoke a group member's ability to sign messages freely. A group signature which can allow the group manager to add new members or delete old members is defined as a dynamic group signature, which is introduced firstly by Chen and Pedersen [5] . They also give a corresponding scheme, however, in which the length of the secret keys of each member and the group manager is linear in the size of the group. Later people give some delete protocols [6, 7] for some group signatures [3, 4] so that they become dynamic. Unfortunately the delete protocols also increase the length of signatures and computational effort for signing and verifying. Furthermore, the length of a signature and / or the computational effort for signing and verifying depends on the number of the deleted group members. So all of them are not efficient.
In this paper, we present an efficient and secure dynamic group signature scheme, which allows the group manager to add new members or delete group members freely. The length of a signature and the computational effort for signing and verifying do not depend on the number of the deleted group members. So our new group signature scheme is more efficient than the schemes in Refs. [5−7] . It may have many practical applications in e-commerce as well as in military.
Dynamic Group Signatures
We begin with a definition of dynamic group signatures.
Definition 1.
A dynamic group signature scheme is a digital signature scheme comprised of the following procedures:
SETUP: an algorithm for generating the initial group public key Y, a dynamic parameter, and a group manager's secret key S.
JOIN: a protocol between the group manager and a user, which makes the user become a new group member.
The user's output is a membership certificate and a corresponding secret key.
DELETE: a protocol between the group manager and group members that results in a group member's ability to sign messages being revoked.
SIGN: an algorithm that, on the input of a group public key, a membership certificate, a secret key, and a message m, outputs a group signature of m.
VERIFY: an algorithm for establishing the validity of an alleged group signature of a message with respect to a group public key.
OPEN: an algorithm that, given a message, a valid group signature on it, a group public key, and a group manager's secret key, determines the identity of the signer.
A dynamic group signature scheme must satisfy the following security properties:
Unforgeability: Only group members are able to sign messages on behalf of the group.
Anonymity: Given a group signature, identifying the actual signer is computationally hard for everyone but the group manager.
Unlinkability:
Deciding whether two different group signatures are computed by the same group member is computationally hard.
Exculpability:
Neither a group member nor the group manager can sign on behalf of other group members. Revocability: A group signature produced using SIGN by a deleted group member must be rejected using a VERIFY.
Preliminaries and Techniques
After giving the notation, this section introduces the building blocks necessary in the subsequent design of our group signature scheme.
Notations
The symbol || denotes the concatenation of two (binary) strings (or of binary representations of integers and group elements) and ' ' denotes the empty string. If A is a set, a∈ R A means that a is chosen at random from A according to the uniform distribution. Finally, we assume a collision resistant hash function H: {0,1}→{0,1} k (k≈160).
Signature of knowledge
Let G=〈g〉 be a cyclic group of order n. The discrete logarithm of y∈G to the base g is the smallest positive integer x satisfying g x =y.
An e-th root of the discrete logarithm of y∈G to the base g is an integer x satisfying g( xe )=y if such an x exists.
The concept of signature of knowledge is introduced by Camenisch [2] . Informally, the signature of knowledge can be seen as an non-interactive proof of knowledge.
The first primitive we define is a signature of the knowledge of the discrete logarithm of y to the base g. It is basically Schnorr Signatureon [8] , a message m of the entity knowing the discrete logarithm of y.
Definition 2.
A pair satisfying is a signature of knowledge of the discrete logarithm of the element is known, by choosing r at random from and computing c and S according to and
satisfying is a signature of equality of the discrete logarithm of the group element z with respect to the base h and the discrete logarithm of the group element y with respect to the base g for the message m. It is denoted by (see
Such a signature can also be computed if the secret key z y x h g log log = = is known, by choosing r at random from and computing c and S according to and 
1 to the base h 1 , and the g-part of the representation of the element y to the bases g and h equaling the discrete logarithm of the element z 2 to the bases g 1 . It is denoted by (see Ref. [3] 
Construction of the Dynamic Group Signature Scheme
Based on the above signatures of knowledge, we propose an efficient and secure dynamic group signature scheme. The following is the details of construction. SETUP The group manager computes the following values: a RSA module and q are two large primes. is a field and
an integer , e is a relative prime to 1 > e ) (n φ . two integers whose e-th roots can not be computed without knowing the factorization of n. 
JOIN
To become a group member, Alice computes her membership certificate as follows:
1) Alice chooses as her secret key, and computes as her public key.
2) To prevent the group manager from learning x, this certificate must be issued using the blind RSA-signature scheme of Chaum [8] .
(1) Alice computes Similarly, Alice can compute her membership certificate:
So Bob's ability to sign messages is revoked because he has not a corresponding membership certificate after time T ′ .
SIGN
To sign a message m, Alice computes the following values: 
VERIFY
The signature is valid if the two signatures of knowledge and are correct. ) , , , , (
The following explains briefly why such a signature convinces a verifier that the signer knows a membership certificate and the corresponding secret key. Consider the signature it 'Proves' that the signer knows her secret key :
1 V x and the pair is an ELGamal encryption ) , ( B A [8] of encrypted under the group manager's public key .
It also 'proves' that the signer's secret key
x is equal to the discrete logarithm of C to the base A . Similarly, the signature V guarantees that the signer knows her membership certificate v because of
In the case of a dispute, the manager can recover the signer's public key and may also give the signature of knowledge
(' ') as the proof.
Security of the Proposed Scheme
Our scheme is secure and coalition-resistant under the RSA and decisional Diffie-Hellman assumptions [4] . The security of the non-interactive variant, i.e. the group signature scheme, relies additionally on the random oracle model.
Unforgeability:
Only group members are able to sign messages on behalf of the group because the group signature scheme is a statistical zero-knowledge (honest-verifier) proof of knowledge of the membership certificate and corresponding secret key, if we assume that hash function H behaves as a random function.
Anonymity:
We know that the signer's public key is encrypted and the underlying signatures of knowledge are statistically zero-knowledge, and no information about is statistically revealed by in the random oracle model. So it is computationally hard for everyone except the group manager to identify the actual signer. [4] .
Exculpability: Neither a group member nor the group manager can sign on behalf of other group members, because all of them don't know other group member's secret key due to the security of blind RSA-signature scheme of Chaum and ELGamal encryption.
Traceability:
From the "open" algorithm, we know that the group manager is able to open any valid group signature and provably identify the actual signer.
Coalition-Resistance:
A colluding subset of group members can not generate a valid signature that can not be traced because only the group manager can issue the group member's membership certificates.
Revocability: A deleted group member can not issue a valid group signature again because he has not a corresponding membership certificate after time T ′ .
Furthermore, the signatures issued by a deleted group member before he is deleted are still anonymous and unlinkable because the DELETE protocol reveals no information about the deleted member.
Efficiency of the Proposed Scheme
Our group signature scheme allows the group manager to add new members or delete group members freely. Furthermore, the length of a signature and the computational effort for signing and verifying do not depend on the number of the deleted group members. So our scheme is more efficient.
Conclusions
This paper presents a dynamic group signature scheme which is more efficient than the previous dynamic group signature schemes.
